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The argument in Republic Book One involves Socrates and three successive 
speakers, Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus; and as the discussion passes 
fron one speaker to the next the argument becomes more serious. The most important 
part of Book One concerns the debate with Thrasymachus, and it is this discussion 
that I wish to examine.^· Thrasymachus gives what appears to be a brief, succinct 
definition of justice, which is usually rendered .something like "Justiceis the inter-
O
est of the stronger," ■ but which could be understood to mean "Justice is what
profits the better." It is not clear what he thinks is profitable nor who or what
the 'better' is. It soon appears that his view was developed from observing the
behavior of human communities, so that he regards justice as the advantage of the
established government, namely, of that group that has power and rules in every city.
Laws are made to the advantage of the better people, the stronger or the ruling group.
Thrasymachus soon agrees, however, that should the rulers err, a just citizen, in
obeying the law, would act contrary to the advantage of the ruler and so be unjust.
Thrasymachus' view is clarified when he develops his position from a straightforward
empirical claim about the way governments function to a more theoretical view which
a
asserts that the ruler, in so far as he practices the skill of ruling and so knows 
What he is doing, never makes a mistake.^ Thrasymachus accepts the notion that a man, 
in so far as he knows, makes no errors. Knowledge confers infallibility. A just 
citizen, then, in a community ruled by a knowing ruler would never act contrary to 
the advantage of the government. Should an error be made, the ruler has failed in 
his skill and no longer is a 'true* ruler. There now emerges the ideal ruler or
Thrasymachan hero.^"
Although Thrasymachus appears to be refuted in the argument based on craft
analogies, which will be discussed in Section III, he ignores Socrates' argument
and returns once again to push his position, and what emerges is the definition that
underlies his argument but was stated inadequately earlier: justice is always what
is profitable to someone else, the good of another, δ κρείττων, while injustice is
one's own, private good, provided you have the strength to get it. The ideal κρείττων
is supremely -unjust because he achieves his own advantage and profit. The ruler
always seeks his Own advantage and ends up with more than anyone else. Πλεονεξία
is the mark of the Thrasymachan hero, and its most complete form lies in the despot
13who can practice injustice oh a great scale and who does not fear reprisal. The
just are so because they are weaker. In this version of his theory Thrasymachus
is anticipating the viéw expressed by Glaucon:
έπ’ αύτοφώρω οδν λάβουμεv αν τόν δίκαιον
τφ άδίχψ είς ταυτσν ιόντα διά την πλεονεξίαν
δ πβκχχ φύσις διώκειν π&ρυκεν ώς άγαθόν, 14
νόμφ δε βίςι παράγεται έπχ την του ίσου τιμήν. 359c3-6
Socrates ' response is finally to shift the argument away from political and civil 
life to the issue of whether the life of the just or unjust man is stronger or 
better, χρείττω (347e).^  After all, the despot is an individual, and his way of 
life is preferred by Thrasymachus and is the ideal for all humans to aspire to.
Socrates becomes concerned that Thrasymachus is making a more dangerous claim than 
first appeared. "What appears to me of greater importance is what Thrasymachus is 
saying now, namely that the life of the unjust man is to be preferred to that of 
the just." A direct consideration of the definition of justice is set aside in 
favor of considering these consequences of being just or unjust. Socrates and Thra­
symachus then pass on to considering which of the two lives, those of justice and 
injustice, involves wisdom, strength, and happiness. Socrates presents these three
3brief arguments of varying merit, the last of which is so short and undeveloped that
a first-time reader easily gets lost,
H
Thrasymachüs ' position begins with a view about the de facto condition of
human societies, then develops to include a more theoretical notion of the ruler as the
practitioner of an art or skill of ruling. After a setback he returns partially to
his former de facto position buttressing his claims by his comparison of rulers and
shepherds and by examples of unjust men getting more than just mai and so being 
1better off. In its final form his argument, I believe, also includes a claim about 
human nature, that it is rooted in a desire to get more, even though that claim is 
not worked out. Thrasymachus believes that the behavior of human societies makes sense 
once one realizes that everyone individually and collectively wants to get as much 
as he can to satisfy his wants. ^
The only refutation of Thrasymachus ' position that justice is the interest
of the stronger occurs in that stage of the argument concerning the infallible ruler
and rests on the craft analogy. The later and more profound definitien that justice
is the advantage of another is not explicitly analyzed in Book One but reappears in
Book Two and forms the counter-position to the one Socrates' sets out to defend at
the urging of Adeimantus:
Follow Glaucon's advice and do not take reputations into 
account, for if you do not deprive them of true reputation 
and attach false reputations to them, we shall say that you 
are not praising justice but the reputation for it, or blaming 
injustice but the appearance of it, that you are encouraging 
one to be unjust in secret, and that you agree with Thra­
symachus thatxftfj**ris another's gpod, the advantage of the 
stronger, while the unjust is one's own advantage and profit, 
though not the advantage of the weaker. 367b5-c5
The remainder of the Republic is a reply to Thrasymachus' final statement (343bl-344c8)
and its development by Glaucon and Adeimantus.
4I propose to argue that the craft argument is not an analogy at all but is 
connected to a set of deeper convictions which Plato held when he wrote the Republic 
and which, to some extent, appear later in that work. The discussion/is at a level 
of discourse designed to evoke as much agreement as Plato can get from a difficult 
opponent who, as I believe Socrates realizes, does not share seme of Socrates' basic 
views of the world. The arguments are not chosen simply to try to persuade Thra- 
symachus but have been selected for their value in leading a learner to see what Plato 
believes to be true, not only about justice but also about man and the cosmos he 
lives in.
The only detailed attempt at refuting Thrasymachus' definition of justice, as I 
have already noted, rests on the craft argument, and that argument concerns the nature 
of knowledge and its power. I shall argue that in Plato's view the nature and ex­
istence of knowledge refutes Thrasymachus and that in employing the craft argument 
to this end Plato presupposes that l)knowledge is always of Form, 2)knowledge, being, 
and power are united, and 3)the Good confers value upon being. These Platonic 
views will emerge in Section II, where I shall discuss two forms of the craft argu­
ment in the conversation with Polemarchus; in Section III, where Socrates attempts 
his principal refutation of Thrasymachus' notion of the ideally unjust ruler; in 
Section IV, where πλεονεξία is a mark of ignorance in the craftsman and cannot be 
a characteristic of wisdom; and in Section V, where I shall attempt to summarize 
my interpretations.
5II. The Prelimiary Argument with Polemarchus
That justice can be considered the result of a craft knowledge is first introduced 
in the Republic at 332dl-2 ediere Polemarchus is prepared to accept Socrates' unravel­
ling of Simonides' "to return what is owed is just"(το τα όφειλόμενα δίκαιον είναι 
άποδιδόναι, 332α7-8) as "this (is) just, to give to each man what is proper to him, 
and he called this what is due" (τουτ’ εΐη δίκαιον, το προσήκον έκάστφ άποδιδόναι, 
τοΟτο δε ώνόμασεν όφειλόμενον, 332c2-3). Polemarchus shortly clarifies the notions of 
ττροσηκον and οφειλόμενον by giving the well-known definition "that it is that (craft) 
which benefits one's friends and harms one's enemies" (ή τοΐς φίλοις τε και εχθρούς 
ώφελίας τε και βλάβας άποδιδοΟαα (τέχνη), 332d5-6).
Socrates shows Polemarchus that crafts are useful in various ways, medicine in 
dealing with health and disease and farming in acquiring crops. So, what is justice 
useful for, or what can one acquire with it? If justice is a craft, then like other 
crafts it must be useful. Throughout the attempt to clarify ^helping one's friends 
and harming one's enemies* Polemarchus' unspoken conviction seems to be that justice 
is sjjkind of trustworthiness, a character-trait which is clearly valuable in fighting 
wars and in engaging in business. Polemarchus does not note the need for trustworthiness 
in the physician, the farmer, and so on because he is unclear about the issues raised 
by Socrates and probably has never been pushed to the kinds of reflection that Socrates 
wants him to engage in. Consequently, when he thinks of justice as a craft, and pri­
marily as a trustworthiness in money-matters which involves some kind of expertise and 
knowing, he easily accepts the idea that the craftsman of justice, just as any other 
practitioner of a skill, can employ his knowledge, to put the matter strongly, for 
either good or evil. The physician is good at curing or at secretly producing disease; 
the boxer is good at landing a blow or protecting himself fron being hit ; the good 
guardian is also good at thievery. In sum, the crafts involve skills that can produce
6opposite results. Crafts are value-neutral¿ they are techniques for achieving gpals. It
is craftsmen who determine use based upon their desires for a given end. What Pole-
marchus does not see is that a physician who uses his knowledge to kill may be plausibly
regarded as a man who has given up the medical craft. It may be argued that all crafts
have good ends to which the techniques of the craft are subservient. When the techniques
are separated from the τέλος, they are no longer part of that craft. Knowledge of a
craft requires knowledge of the τέλος and an intention to reach that τέλος or one is
no longer a craftsman. We shall return to this issue later.
by his divorce of means from ends
When Polemarchus discovers that/a just man is now a kind of thief, he is at a loss,
"I don't any longer know what I meant,..." (334b7) Although he had a good intuition of 
justice as being a kind of character-trait, once it was assimilated to a kind of knowledge, 
he saw justice as being like other kinds of knowledge that are means to ends normally 
considered good, such as health, fighting, and food production, but that, as pure means, 
are capable of being used for other ends that are not usual, as medicine for the purpose 
of killing. He did not see justice as necessarily concerned with an end that is always 
the same, the good, and which cannot be altered without altering the knowledge and the 
pursuit.
This discussion with Polemarchus shows that Plato is well aware that skills 
employed within crafts that are normally considered part of the craft can be detached 
from the craft and viewed as pure means and value-neutral. It is possible, then, to 
construct an argument in which the craft-name is still used to label the technique or 
part but the τέλος of the craft is dropped. As we shall see, Plato does not accept 
the notion of a value-neutral craft except as an abstraction from the lived-kosmos.
In the end all crafts will be subsumed under the notion of the good, just as all human 
action is; for, a craft is not simply a bit of knowledge but a knowledge of how to
I*
accomplish some task, an έργον. <Jt is not unimportant that έπίστασθαι means to know how 
to.) Commentators have fastened on this argument with Polemarchus in order to
6a
draw conclusions about the arguments with Thrasymachus, in some cases to argue that 
Plato is plainly duplicitous and manipulative. For, with Thrasymachus he appears to ignore 
the notion he employs here with Polemarchus, that crafts can be used for contrary pur­
poses . They point out that Plato knows perfectly well that not only can the craft be
cvfV
used in contrary ways, but the craftsman/choose to employ his knowledge as he sees 
fit and for his own ends, CdCqt. To see a craft's techniques as value-neutral is to 
permit the decision of how to use the craft to fall to the practitioner. It is the 
physician who determines whether his medical skills shall be used to heal or to kill, 
not the medical craft, and anyone's 'how to* skills become subservient to whatever ends 
he chooses. So, when Plato employed this argument and revealed that he understood its 
significance, he was being unfair later on to use a notion of craft whereby a craft 
aims only at themed, a view which he knew could not be defended. In sum, so this 
view goes, Plato uses whichever notion he finds useful to win his argument.
The argument with Polemarchus continues and leads to a discussion in which the valuer 
neutral notion of the craft is ignored; and it is ignored because it must be, if Socrates, 
by employing the craft argument , is going to convince Polemarchus that a good man, and so a 
just man, harms no one. Polemarchus agrees that craftsmen qua craftsmen by practicing their 
crafts, make things better, not worse: musicians, by practicing music, make men musical; 
the teachers of horsemanship, by practicing their craft, make men horsemen; and so men who 
practice justice, which is a human excellence, cannot make men bad but must make them 
good. In this argument Socrates does not allow the separation of craft fron craftsman 
or craft from its τέλος so that the craft now cannot be subordinated to the craftsman's 
personal intentions. To what extent Plato can make this identification plausible will be 
examined later in conjunction with his argument with Thrasymachus, What we must be clear 
about now is that in his discussion with Polemarchus Plato uses two forms of the craft argu­
ment, one which sees the craft as value-neutral and as technique and a second which sees 
the craft as intrinsically connected to a good or τέλος.
7III. The Craft Argument
After Socrates points out one of the consequences of Thrasymachus ' empirical 
position, that since de facto rulers do make mistakes and do not act always in 
their own interest, they may rule obedient citizens who end up acting contrary to 
the best interests of the rulers, Thrasymachus asserts that his ruler άκριβει 
λόγψ possesses the τέχνη of ruling, and such knowledge, by implication, contributes 
very much to his success. Socrates seizes upon Thrasymachus ' new statement and 
by employing his own notion of τέχνη constructs the crucial refutation of Thra­
symachus. The argument is a brief one and runs a bit over one Stephanus page, 
341c4-342ell. The steps in the argument are as follows:
1. Every true craftsman is engaged in an activity directed towards an object. 341c4d4 
Plato has two examples, one of the physician and the other of the helmsman.
The physician is a physician "in the strict sense," δ τφ άκριβει λόγψ ιατρός,
"the real physician," τον τψ δντι ιατρόν όντα . The helmsman is called a 
helmsman κατά την τέχνην και την των ναυτών άρχήν . A physician or helmsman 
in the strict sense is a real one due to his craft. The knowledge of the craft 
determines the being of the craftsman in relation to his craft.
2. There is something profitable for each (the craftsman and the object). 341d5-6 
Grube translates, "And there is something which is advantageous to each of 
these, that is: patients and sailors?" (The underlined portion indicates 
Grube’s added explanation of the text.) The Greek is ambiguous, and I think it 
likely that, at the very least, Thrasymachus in his understanding is including 
both the craftsman and his object despite the fact that the discussion is now 
limited to true craftsman. After all, the discussion is about craftsmen and 
their objects, and it would be natural to asstime a broad reference. Socrates 
will not deny that knowledge of a craft is advantageous to the craftsman^
8even though he will deny that it is the natural goal of the craft to provide stich an 
advantage. At this point in the argument there is ambiguity, and it is not necessary 
to suppose that έχόστφ τούτων clearly refers to the objects of the crafts alone.
3. Every craft naturally has the purpose of seeking aid providing for the 
profit of each. 341d7-9
Socrates and Thrasymachus probably have a different understanding of έκάστψ 
the one thinking of the object and the other including both the craftsman 
and the object. The argument in its next step considers the craftsman qua 
craft and not qua man or person and so sharply restricts the issues so that 
the benefit to the craftsman is ignored. The craftsman and his craft are 
indistinguishable, and attention is focused on the craft. In fact, Thra­
symachus is puzzled by Socrates' next question. Thrasymachus immediately re­
turns to this point at 343aff. where he reasserts his view that the practice 
of a craft is for the benefit of the craftsman. For Thrasymachus Socrates' 
reduction of the craftsman to his craft obscures the real issue.20 Socrates' 
restriction of the argument has underlying it Plato's views l)of the Good 
and its connection to being, mind, and truth and 2)of nature, views which 
Thrasymachus did not share. I believe that Thrasymachus had no idea of the 
significance of this restriction in the argument until it was too late, for he 
apparently had a very different idea of knowledge.
214. What is profitable for every craft is to be as complete as possible. 341dl0-ll
a. The object to which the craft is directed is defective and in need.
The craft is designed to provide what is profitable for its object, viz. 
to remedy the defects of the object. 341e2-9
8a
b. The craft Itself is not defective or in need of any excellence. It never 
misses the mark. 342al-b8
c. Therefore, every craft seeks what is profitable for its object (since
it itself is complete and in no need, whereas its object is in need and 
defective). 342cl-7
The argument has shifted away from the craftsman to the craft. Socrates 
continues the medical example and asserts that medicine was discovered
9in order to remedy the defects of the body which is πονηρόν . In 
general πονηρός means to be in a bad condition and, here, defective, 
so that the body qua πονηρόν is in need, προσόειται . It is
lacking and incomplete. Πονηρός is a common word, frequently
used of people and meaning wicked, worthless, morally bad. Its 
opposite is αγαθός . morally good, useful . A τέχνη is designed to 
bring its object to its excellence or good, άρετή , just as, Socrates 
believes, a ruler's craft is designed to guide a community so that its 
citizens can reach their human good.
The craft, unlike its object, is τελέα and so has no needs. The 
eyes and the ears, like the body, need seeing and hearing as their goods, 
άρεταύ , but the crafts qua crafts (as knowledges) need no fulfill­
ment. They are fullfilled and so possess their άρεταί . Neither 
does any craft need a second craft, for each craft is sufficient for its 
object. Nor does it need itself to consider its own profit since there 
is no defect to be remedied; it has its good.
No craft possesses defects, πονηρύαι , or faults, άμαρτίαι , nor 
does any craft seek anything profitable except for its object. Each 
craft is undamaged, άβλαβής , and unmixed, ακέραιος , since it is
correct, ορθή , as long as it is the exact, ακριβής , and whole, όλη ,
craft that it is, ifaep έστύν .
Crafts have authority over their objects. 342c8-10
Therefore, no knowledge considers the advantage of the stronger but that of 
the weaker. 342c11-d1
Plato assimilates the entire discussion of τέχνη to έπιστήμη because 
he has been talking about a complete and perfect τέχνη . He frequently 
distinguishes the two where τέχνη is imperfect and based on limited,
10
temporal experience. The predicates of τελέα , ολη , and ακέραιος 
and the contrasting ττσνηράν together with δεϊ and προσδειται
prepared the ground for this conclusion. The craft is the stronger 
since it has no needs or defects. The objects of the crafts are 
weaker because they do have needs.
In this attempted refutation of Thrasymachus, Plato is applying his notion
of Form to the question of the nature of justice from a perspective that allows
him to communicate with Thrasymachus, who, most certainly, is not a man who would
accept Plato's doctrine of Form. For Plato knowledge, έπιστήμη , is always of
Form; but since he cannot introduce his view directly, he uses familiar Socratic
22examples taken from the crafts. 'Επιστήμη can easily become τέχνη
because he is talking about justice as it exists in the behavior of states; the 
skills and knowledges involved are all practical. Furthermore, Socrates is con­
vinced that the existence of the crafts, no matter how imperfect the knowledge may 
be, reveals that there .is' knowledge. Socrates'respect for craftsmen is based 
ontheirknowing how to do what they do, unlike politicians who have vague opinions 
and prejudices and cannot explain or defend what they do and frequently are 
incompetent in reaching whatever goals they do have. In order to convince people 
that there is knowledge of value and not just opinion, Socrates has them ack­
nowledge that in an ordinary way we all recognize that there is craft-knowledge, 
τέχνη ; next, that there are better and worse craftsmen; and finally that 
there must be a kind of ideal case, a complete knowledge of a craft that is the 
goal of the craftsman.
In this argument a craft exists for a purpose, to secure the advantage of 
its object and the advantage for itself which is to be ότι μάλιστα τελέαν.
Oô καί ή τέχνη, ήν δ ’ έγώ, έπί τούτψ πέφυκεν, έπί τφ το συμφέρον
11
s 23
έκάστψ ζητεϊν τε καί έκπορt£eiVj(3Wd7-#). It is here that the practical and
the theoretical come together. In order for a τέχνη that is established to
obtain the good of the object which is its purpose, say medicine and healing,
the τέχνη must be as complete as possible. There are, then, two advantages
mentioned here that he wishes to unite, the good of the object for which the
τέχνη was established and the good of the τέχνη which is its own knowledge
of what it has to do.
Plato is suggesting that a τέχνη Qua έπχστήμη as comPlete in itself but 
a τέχνη qua τέχνη is complete only in its use. A τέχνη can only t>e
a τέχνη if it is a knowing in action. The very notion of a τέχνη helps to 
carry the point for him. By its very nature, πέφυκεν (34Id-8), it has a purpose, 
and purposes are only attained in actions. The passage that follows, where Plato 
asks whether a τέχνη considers its own advantage (342bl), considers advantage 
in two senses. The τέχνη qua τελέα '( όλη » not ότι μάλιστα ) has no 
advantage to seek since it already possesses its perfection in its own skill.
The τέχνη qua directed to its object (e.g. healing) does seek an advantage 
that lies in the grounds of its own establishment, the healing of the body. So, 
a perfected skill does not seek its own advantage, since it already, crua έταστήμη 
is perfected, but seeks an advantage, nonetheless, in accomplishing its purpose, 
the well-being of its object.
To have knowledge for Plato is to use it. In the nature of things there is 
no gap between knowing and doing. To have a knowledge called medical points to 
its use, so, too, a knowledge called justice. I think White is correct when 
he says,
I am inclined to believe, in fact, that Plato thought that the mere 
apprehension of the Good could move a person to action without 
any other further step of any kind, and that, for him, to apprehend
12
the good fully along with a situation in which it might be exemplified 
simply is to have a desir^overwhelming all others to see that 
instantiation take place.
Knowledge in its perfection is always a doing, a notion, I think, that is involved
in the demiurge of the Timagus who has no jealousy but brings goodness to the
world. The doctrine is reflected in th^iotion of being as doing and undergoing
in the Sophist. The fullness of being that is the characteristic of the Forms
involves, their acting, viz., being effective within the cosmos.
Craft-knowledge, just as knowledge of virtue, in common experience may be
used or not, as we decide. Plato is supporting the Socratic belief that virtue
25
is knowledge . The craftsman qua
craftsman will always do his best, but the craftsman as a complex human being
may fail to apply his craft. Why does this happen? We may say that at that
moment of action he does not possess his knowledge or he would use it; or else
that a higher, more directive purpose determines the withholding of use for a
perceived greater good. A physician may know how to heal his patient but
may refuse to do so. He does not lack knowledge, but he refuses to use it.
He refuses to be a healer of the sick in a particular case. He makes his
decision on the basis of some value more important to him. Because of this
difficulty Socrates' argument abandoned the craftsman for the craft. The
craft, if operative, will do its best; the craftsman, however, may cease being
a craftsman. On the other hand, since ruling is the highest and most complete
craft because it encompasses under its control the full range of human actions
and so includes all of virtue since it is knowledge of the good, the craft of
ruling, if possessed in full, would never fail to be effective in the ruler.
There are no rulers, however,Wbo completely possess the knowledge of the
ruling, just as no human can have complete knowledge of anything. The nature
26
of the human soul prevents this from happening.
13
Plato is well aware that there is a gap in men between what they call knowing
$H 27
and acting, ahd even the philosopher kingsMA/not escape the need to be compelled
to perform their duties should they be reluctant to return to the cave. The 
embodied human, even if he be a philosophic ruler, is a complex of the multiple 
forces of έρω£ , and his soul will never be in total harmony. The 
argument before us, however, is a narrow one that focuses on the identity of 
power, knowledge, and being. To the extent that someone embodies knowingjhe 
will act, for knowledge itself is not complete without its exercise. Knowledge 
is being and power. To the extent knowledge is not present there is no power 
from that domain.. To have knowledge for Plato means that a person embodies 
knowledge so that he acts and is the knowledge. In being one's knowledge a 
person is good. If knowledge is possessed completely, there is no gap between 
knowing and acting in which a person may be said to 'know' that x is the right 
thing to do but that he is in doubt about actually doing it. This is a conviction 
derived from Parmenides and pervades his views of being and of the cosmos.
Part of this Platonic argument is that a τέχνη is established because 
the object to which it is applied has a need. At 3A1e4 medicine exists because 
the body is defective and is not self-sufficient; the purpose of medicine is to 
cure the body's ills. A critic may argue, however, that there are τέχναι that 
are not designed to remedy a defect in the craft's object. Some skills do not 
appear to seek the welfare of their objects, _e.g. warfare, boxing, safecracking. 
Indeed, we may say that the whole class of competitive games seeks to win and, in 
the parlance of the sports writer, to annihilate one's opponent. It has always
been a puzzle why Plato attempted to use the argument of the τέχναι to
28
establish his point since there are skills that do not fit his model.
A physician tries to heal this body, an easily locatable object for which 
the benefit is obvious. A helmsman practices his skill in trying to bring his
14
ship safely to port, thereby preserving the ship, the cargo, any passengers, and 
his crew. If he is successful in bringing the ship safely to port, the cargo, 
passengers, and crew will be benefited. The purpose is accomplished when the 
object is safe and no longer at sea. Warfare, boxing, and safecracking, however, 
are not easily placed into the schema Plato is using. The general practices a 
craft whose purpose appears to be to win a battle or war by destroying its 
Objects, enemy soldiers and property. He apparently practices his skill on 
objects that he does not intend to benefit. The boxer wishes to knock out his 
opponent (hardly to the opponent's benefit); and the safecracker wishes to open 
the safe, whose purpose and well-being lies in remaining closed. The safe may 
be destroyed by explosives or may be simply violated, contrary to its purpose.
The objects acted on by the craft all seem to suffer rather than to benefit.
It has been pointed out, as well, that justice itself, even if it were a
kind of craft-knowledge, would still be very different from other kinds of
29crafts. Indeed, it has been claimed that Socrates revealed as much in his 
argument with Polemarchus where justice was only useful when objects were not 
being used; or worse, justice became a kind of thtevery. Justice is useful, however, 
in all situations and so is quite different from steering a ship, an activity 
that is useful’Only at sea, and from medicine, which is useful for the sick. So, 
not only are there problems with skills that are destructive but also with 
supposing justice is similar in its object-specification to other skills such 
as medicine and steersmanship.
I think plausible answers can be given to these objections. First of all, 
skills are designed to accomplish some task that needs to be done. The state 
of affairs that is the goal is not in existence, and in some sense the world 
lacks or is deficient qua this goal. Secondly, for Plato no τέχνη can exist 
which does not fit under the notion of the good; so, while Plato may grant that
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skills can be used for evil purposes, I do not think he believes that these are 
licit or in accord with nature. In the end the practice of any skill is subsumed 
under a complex of actions, all of which must conduce to the production of 
good, otherwise the actions produce evil which is not a characteristic of being 
in its fullness (viz. in its eternity) but is a defect and a loss of power and so 
will lead to human wretchedness. To do good is to enhance power, and Plato sees 
all skills as aiming at such power, whether restoring^ower to the sick (medicine) 
or developing a power that is latent in the young (education). Martial skills 
are developed when the unity of community is threatened or has been destroyed. 
Their use has but one purpose, the restoration of or protection of the unity that 
is power. All persons are seen as needing correction (Gorgias 525b4-c1) in 
order to be guided to the good; so,"too, πόλεις > or groups of men, need similar 
correction should they attack a good community. The practice of martial arts, 
whether in warfare or in boxing, is always defensive or corrective. Safecracking 
is an example of criminal activity, all of which is anti-social behavior dis­
ruptive of the community. The skills employed by the safecracker can all be 
used in other actions for good (unifying) púrposes. In and of themselves the 
skills he uses unlock power that resides in being.
The use of skills, narrowly conceived, to destroy and to divide are doomed 
to failure in the long run because they create the divisive conditions 
dramatized by Plato in his brief example of the thigves (351aff.). Φόρμακσυ 
means both poison and a healing drug in recognition that a remedy can always be 
used for good or evil. The evil physician is one who possesses the narrow 
skills but does not embody the purpose of medicine within the hierarchy of 
goods. To call one a physician, ιατρός , who does not know that he is such a 
healer, töxai > is to misapply the word. Such a man does not know what 
he is as a man and so cannot locate the proper exercise of his skill. The
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same, for Plato, applies to the general or the boxer. The evil general is one 
who does not understand that the goal of war is peace and so is a general ambiguous­
ly. Justice is a skill that has as its object the securing of the human good by the 
maintenance of order according to a hierarchy of powers that produce good. From the 
time Thrasymachus introduces the notion of the infallible ruler the argument is 
idealized. Even later, when Thrasymachus abandons the discussion in ideal terms, 
the Socratic assumptions of τέχνη and έπιστήμη are still present. We can think of 
skills in a narrow way, to be tosed for good or ill, but in the end Plato does not 
think this is a correct understending of their nature, since skills exist only as 
practiced by persons. Skills can be treated as abstractions, but in fact we only have 
persons with skills. The key to appreciating Plato's point is seeing that all human 
activities exist only as means for the good. To abstract the activity, such as skill, 
from the broader idea of good is to make a serious error.^0
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IV. The Just Man is Wise
As pointed out earlier, after the craft argument Thrasymachus re-emphasizes
his views and continues to develop his position. Socrates is now no longer
concerned about Thrasymachus* definition of justice but about his glorification
of the life of injustice. Socrates formulates three successive arguments to
show that justice is wisdom, strength, and happiness. I shall examine only
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the argument concerning wisdom since it is the most relevant to the craft
argument and to suggesting Plato's views of Form and the nature of the cosmos.
Thrasymachus has claimed that the unjust man is wise and powerful and that
he strives to get as much as he can. In the craft argument Socrates tried to
show that any craftsman-knower in the practice of his craft pursues the good
of the object, not of himself considered apart form his craft. The practice of
a craft may run counter to the satisfaction of the desires, broadly considered,
of the craftsman. 'Getting more for oneself’ is not a motto for any craftsman
qua craftsman and is irrelevant to him. Socrates now tries to indicate the
nature of the good that the object needs and that the craftsman provides. He
suggests that ’getting more* is not only foreign to a craftsman and his
craft but also to the object of the craft as well. S3
Πλεονεξία, πλεονεκτεΐν , and πλέον έχειν mean greediness, arrogance,
excess, to have more than one's share, to take advantage, to have the best of,
and, as Grube says, "...come(s) to mean 'to outdo, to over-reach, to do better 
32than'." To have more has been shown to be irrelevant to knowledge which is
complete in itself. A craftsman qua craftsman is fulfilled and satisfied in
his knowledge. To have more or an advantage involves comparison and pertains to
actions that are in themselves not subject to inherent limit. Socrates
shows that the task of the craftsman is to hit the mark or to attain the proper
33balance in order to achieve the good of the object.
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The argument employed by Socrates seems so needlessly complex that Comford omit­
ted its translation in his famous edition, claiming that "only a very loose paraphrase 
could liberate the meaning from the stiff form of the original."^ Socrates himself 
acknowledges that any attempt to persuade Thrasymachus at this point will be harder since 
Thrasymachus "includes injustice under virtue and wisdom, and justice among their op­
posites." (348el-6) Socrates has already employed his principal direct arguments, viz, 
the craft arguments, so he now turns to an indirect form. The argument falls into four 
sections. The first is a characterization of the unjust and just man in terms of πλέον 
ëyeiv(349b2-cl0) ; the second produces the principle that both the unjust and just man 
have such characteristics as those whom they are like (349cll-dl2) ; the third shows that 
no knower, as evidenced by the musician and the physician, wishes to πλείω αιρεΐσθαι 
than a fellow expert (349dl3-350al0) ; and finally the conclusion is drawn that the mjust 
man is like the ignorant man in his πλεονεξία, while the just man is akin to the wise 
man (350all-cll).
In the first two parts of the argument Plato employs the ambiguous πλέον έχειν to 
describe both the unjust man, in the sense of 'have more, ' and the just man, in the sense 
of 'do better,' because Thrasymachus applies the notion of πλέον έχειν to his hero and 
so willingly connects wisdom to it. The terms of the discourse are exactly what Thrasym­
achus wants, and he must have smiled with satisfaction when Socrates claimed that the just 
man would think it just and worthwhile άδίκου πλεονεκτεΐν (349b8). Here is Socrates claim­
ing that a just man 'wants more' and so would like to be κρείττων, as Thrasymachus' first 
definition indicated, but cannot be such because he is powerless ! In this fashion Thrasym- 
chus commits himself to injustice as πλεονεξία and πλεονεξία as wisdom and goodness.
Socrates goes on in parts three and four to show that a wise and good man does not 
want πλέον έχειν, so that the unjust man in πλεονεκτεΐν is the opposite of the wise and 
good; he is ignorant and bad. The conclusion is supposed to hold because the knower's re­
lation to the not-knower is parallel or like the relation of the just man to the un­
just man. In terms of the fourth part of the argument, that the knower does not want
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nor does he think it good to have more (do better than) another knower whereas he does 
want to do better (have more) than a non-knower is like the relation of the just man
'Qtf pvRSö 0&
to the unjust man. Since the relations are like each other, have the same char­
acteristics. Thrasymachus had claimed that the unjust man always wants more and 
gets it and this constitutes his wisdom and his goodness. To indicate to Thrasymachus 
that this view cannot be correct, Socrates develops a counter sequence that begins
with a knower, a musician or a physician, and shows that his relation to the non­
ets; bevte/ΐ oä
expert rests partially on πλέον έχειν , since the knower/has more knowledge than the 
non-expert who knows little or nothing. This 'having more knowledge* means, of course, 
a recognition of limit in tuning and in healing and is a tantalizing Socratic para­
dox that lies below the surface. 'Having more* in some sense is accepting limit.
The knower in relation to another knower, however, never wants to have more or do 
better. So, the knower's relation to his opposite is parallel to the relation of 
the just man to the unjust man. Socrates thinks that he has shown that πλεονεξία 
cannot be a characteristic of wise men in relation to each other and to their objects; 
and wise men are only paradoxically πλέον έχειν in relation to ignorant mai. Wise 
men are not characterized by wanting more. When they interact with the objects of 
their knowledge, they seek to establish a limit in those objects. Such an argument 
suggests that wisdom must bring with it, both for the craftsman and for his object, 
limit.
Socrates seems to establish only that a just man and a wise man ressemble each 
other, not that a just man is wise. Yet, this argument continues to develop the con­
trast that emerged in the first series of arguments with Thrasymachus, that between 
the man of πλεονεξία who is forever incomplete, striving to outdo, to overreach, and 
to overcome, and the craftsman whose craft is complete and whole and who attempts to 
introduce such wholeness as he can into the objects of his craft that/in need. Socrates
17c
tries to show to Thrasymachus that πλέον δχειν and its incompleteness do not character 
any of the objects known that are in good condition. The wise man 
is always a person who 'in tightening and loosening* does not seek to excel another 
knower. This argument is quite abstract and does not directly introduce the notion 
of measure except by the implication of tuning in the actions of the musician and 
'balancing' in the case of the physician, but surely Plato's intentions are clear 
enough.
ize knowffts/nor
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In timeless objects one cannot get more than the whole of what is, and the 
fulfillment of the ideal knower rests on the wholeness of the object. In time, 
however, there is a mixing of parts, not a wholeness. The entities in time can 
never be what they are since they are always in process of becoming. In time the 
craftsman is always blending characteristics, such as balancing the tensions of 
strings or thé powers of the body to produce what is the best possible at the 
moment. To hit the mark is to attain what is highest and most complete in 
action; to get more or less of any characteristic is to produce a poor mix and 
to miss what is best. The completion or fulfillment in time is filling the
now with the most that it can receive of its proper ingredients----and this
mix is the best.
Because time is pictured as a line, we can speak of an όρθός amount, 
a correct or straight amount, which is the harmonious blend of qualities that 
produces the excellence of the object, for the correct amount allows the object 
to pursue a straight path to its fulfillment. It is only a total knowledge which 
can decide the correct measure of ingredients for a temporal object that can 
never fulfill all of what it can be in a changing world. Only by knowing the 
whole of what objects are can one decide how incomplete mixes of particulars 
can attain what is best for them. The recipe, the μέτρσν , is the application 
of the whole to its part.50
The craft argument discloses that knowledge (and its object, Form) is com­
plete, whereas objects, the entities in space and tifl\e that knowledge is applied 
to, are in need and incomplete. Socrates supposes there is an ultimate good 
in which the needs of the object can be satisfied, while Thrasymachus sees only 
a continuous search for satisfaction. Socrates now indicates that the
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wisdom of knowledge in time is knowing how to measure the ingredients of the
moment to maximize the excellence of the object. There is a limit, then, in
time that is the good, a measure, just as there is the limit in the eternal that
34
is the total good, a whole.
Seeking only to get more will produce happiness according to Thrasymachus, 
whereas for Socrates happiness is getting enough. Implied in the Thrasymachan 
view is a constant struggle to obtain what is needed to produce temporary satis­
factions. The goods that he seems to be thinking about are those that Socrates 
will condemn as false pleasures in Book . The Socratic view is that some 
relief from the struggle in human life can be obtained, provided the proper 
goods are pursued. In human life happiness is produced not by attempting to 
satisfy a multiplying group of random desires but by finding a kind of serenity 
produced by seeing things sub specie aeternitatis. Socrates has shown Thrasymachus 
that knowledge is whole and complete, so not in need, but Thrasymachus persists in 
holding onto his goal of 'getting more', not realizing, in Socrates' view, that 
his formula is fátally quantitative because it is based entirely on satisfying 
those needs that have no inherent limit. To get enough in time requires a limit, 
the proper measure, which is the whole of the moment; so if one. wishes to be 
satisfied while living in a changing world, one must seek out those activities 
that permit an enduring wholeness rather than those that fade in the moment. 
Thrasymachus' view misconceives the nature of the cosmos and so, too, the role 
and peculiar power of νοΟς in bringing wholeness, and so what is enough, to 
human beings.
It is also true that there is a quantitative dimension to Plato's views.
He assumes that what persists is better, and so the valuationally higher must 
last longer. The pleasures of sex, food, and exercise are activities that can 
produce joy, but the satisfaction is for a short time and is more or less mixed 
with pain. The instability of wealth, reputation, and health, always present on
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any classical list of desirables, reveals their drawbacks. In the end the 
internal exercise of νο(3ς and its pleasures are superior, tñLLy
because they suffer the least possibility of being taken away. Getting more 
of some things, however, for Plato means acquiring what is qualitatively better. 
These are the things in which limi 
knowledge which is rooted in the fullness of eternity. For Plato the transitory 
nature of certain pleasures indicates their rootedness in change. Their 
natures involve more change as part of their realization in time than do others. 
In what way Plato supposes the joys of the mind are qualitatively better than 
the joys of the body I shall leave unexamined.
nherent, and pre-eminent among them is
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FOOTNOTES
^C.E.M. Joad wrote an interesting tract entitled Thrasymachus in 1926 that contemporary 
readers should find interesting for its views of morality in the twenties and prospects 
for the future. In reference to the discussions with Cephalus and Polemarchus he says, 
"Several tentative definitions of Justice are given, which Socrates has no difficulty 
in showing to be inadequate by the peculiarly irritating methods of dialectic for which 
the Athenians so excusably poisoned him." p. 1
^338c 1-2 (All citations of the Greek text are from Burnet's Oxford edition. Quotations 
in English are taken from Grube's edition.) φημί, yap έγω εϋνοα το δίχαιον ούκ άλλο τι 
ή τδ τοΟ κρεύττονος συμφέρον. I follow Kerferd in believing that Thrasymachus does not 
regard this statement as a definition but as "a deliberate paradox framed in terms such 
as to arrest the attention,..." I, p. 26. This initial formulation is framed fron the 
point of view of the ruled only. For Thrasymachus' justice is another's good and in­
justice one's own good, 344c 7-8. Sparshott regards Thrasymachus' answer as "not an 
improved criterion but an illuminating truth about the actions agreed to be just." p.
423 Kerferd defends his interpretation in Fhronesis against Hourani. For a detailed 
rejection of Kerferd, see J.P. Maguire's article. P.P. Nicholson defends Kerferd's 
view of what Thrasymachus wants to argue and provides an excellait summary of the issues. 
I share most of Nicholson's views and believe his presentation is one of the best in 
the literature. See pp. 227-229 for his summary of why Thrasymachus begins with this 
paradox rather than with his definition which comes later.
O
If Thrasymachus' real definition of justice is the interest of another, does Socrates 
ever address this issue? Not directly, since the discussion moves away from the issue 
of the definition of justice to its consequences. He cannot, however, effectively de­
bate this issue with Thrasymachus until he turns the discussion away from justice as 
a social phenomenon allied with ruling to justice as a characteristic of a human soul.
The prior debate largely considered justice as a function of a ruler and his citizens. 
Now, I think, because Thrasymachus has delivered himself of his genuine view of the 
nature of justice, in the arguments concerning strength and happiness Socrates begins 
to move the focus to the individual and his internal well-being. It is clear that the 
Thrasymachan definition is the opposite of Socrates' view. Justice, for Socrates, is 
advantageous to a man for himself and for another, since justice is the functioning 
of goodness in the individual and in the polis. Goodness is never jealous; and so, when 
a good man cones into existence, he enjoys the experienced goodness in himself and in 
its manifestations towards others. Socrates' developed position in Book Nine reveals 
that in the first instance justice and goodness are characteristics of a human soul which 
manifest themselves in human behavior.
^That Thrasymachus has a position that commentators agree upon is far from the case.
The literature is fairly extensive, so I shall not review it here. Whether he is a 
nihilist, ethical naturalist, legalist, psychological egoist, to use Kerferd's classi­
fication, or something else I shall not argue. There are reasons for thinking that he 
is all of these because his 'view' is not developed in detail. Modem conmentators 
have particular difficulty, I think, because they are looking for a strong concept of 
obligation, for presumably without a meaningful sense of ought, there is no moral theory;
2but such a strong notion of ought is simply not there. Discussions of Thrasymachus’ 
and Plato's positions in terms of 'right' obscure the views that they actually held.
For both Socrates and Thrasymachus obligation is an inperfect condition resting on an 
inadequate knowledge of what is the good in general and what it is for a particular 
person. If someone knows the good, he shall surely do it. To feel obliged to do an act 
means that he is acting with doubts or resistances to the goodness of the act, partic­
ularly its goodness for him. Thrasymachus regards just men as weak, physically inade­
quate or intellectually foolish or both. To pursue what one wants is not a matter of 
obligation for Thrasymachus, and he would have regarded it as silly to suppose that 
anyone should need to feel obliged. If a man does feel obliged, it is the result of 
successful social conditioning by the people in power, and such obligation is designed 
for their benefit, not his. A second difficulty that I find among commentators is the 
vague use of the word 'moral. ' The term is usually undefined so it is difficult to 
know what the writer is including or excluding. Commentators seem to be searching for 
the aforementioned doctrine of obligation and sane associated notion of will or choice 
in order to satisfy themselves that Thrasymachus has an ethical theory to account for 
what is moral, non-moral, and inmoral. Nicholson seems to hold a view similar to my 
own, pp. 216-217»
^347e 2-4 πολύ δέ pot δοκεΐ μεΐζον είναι θ νυν λέγει Ορασύραχος, τον τού άδικου 
βίον φάσκων είναι κρείττω ή τον τού δικαίου. English cannot capture the importance of 
the ambiguity in κρείττω here and κρείττονος of the original definition. In the first 
passage it is regularly rendered by 'stronger' and in this one by 'better.' As far as 
the word is concerned, what is better is stronger and vice versa, although κρείττων 
may be used in contexts where either meaning seemingly overwhelms the other. The con­
trasting word is ήττων which may be rendered 'inferior' and 'weaker.'
S338d 7- 339a 4
^Thrasymachus makes his claim not only for the ruler and the craftsman but also for the 
wise man: ώστε δημιουργός ή σοφός ή άρχων ούδεις αμαρτάνει τότε όταν άρχων ή. 340e 4-5
I*-*"In effect he (Socrates) is calling upon Thrasymachus further to define his position 
and is pointing out that Thrasymachus is offering two accounts of justice. You can 
either define justice as 'the interest of the stronger' or as 'the laws which the strong­
er make,' but not as both since there will be occasions when the two do not coincide." 
Kerferd I, p. 20
^340c 6-341a 4 P.P. Nicholson, pp. 224-225, argues against those who believe that 
Thrasymachus has blundered "by abandoning a realistic empiricism for an idealism which 
makes him an easy victim for Socrates,..." Nicholson denies that Thrasymachus has been 
manipulated and concludes that "the perfect ruler is a crucial and logically deliberate 
step in the unfolding of his ideas. By taking it, Thrasymachus has raised the whole 
argument to a higher level." At 339c 4-8 Thrasymachus grants that laws can be made 
correctly, to the ruler's advantage, or incorrectly, not to his advantage. Correctly 
made laws would be just; incorrectly made ones, unjust. There is, then, a standard of 
measurement for advantage. He reaffirms this view when he defends the notion of an 
infallible ruler. This position shows that Thrasymachus believes that the world can be 
known and mistakes can be made. He is as comm.tted to knowledge as Socrates is, but 
it is doubtful that he had ever explored what ontological commtments his belief in 
knowledge might entail.
12 *Rather, since Thrasymachus has argued the ruler's infallibility on the basis of an 
analogy between the art of ruling and other arts, like those of the craftsman and 
physician, he turns the analogy against his opponent.. .Kerferd thinks that this argurpent 
begs the question completely, But it seems to me to be a clever dialectical retort." 
Davis, p . 427
13343e 7-c8
^Thrasymachus works within the framework of ordinary language use, so his ideal man 
is called unjust. His view, however, distinguishes between a natural condition of 
πλεονεξία and a conventional justice which depends on the enactments of the ruler.
Should the νόμοι actually be in the interest of the stronger, the ruler, they very well 
may not be in the interest of the weaker, the citizens, and so in violation of the 
citizens* own πλεονεξία. Since the weaker are weak, however, they simply cannot achieve 
their wishes. Other interpreters who also see a close relation between Thrasymachus 
and the position put forward by Glaucon are Cross and Woozley, p. 69; Annas, pp. 8-9; 
also P.P. Nicholson remarks, . .men are in competition for scarce resources...," 
p. 223.
^The shift has already occurred in Thrasymachus ' retort to the craft argument where 
he defines injustice in relation to the individual, τό δ* άδικον έαυτφ λυσιτελουν 
τε κα\ συμφέρον. 344c 8
w 343d 3-e7
17 \343e 7- 344al λέγω γάρ σνπερ νυνδή έλεγον, τόν μεγάλα δυνάμενσν πλεονεκτειν.
".. .the thesis of universal competition which is the hidden premise of the whole dis·’
cussion. It is in fact plain that Thrasymachus does think that there are two different
kinds of people, the self-seekers and the other servers;.. .'* Sparshott, p. 431
■^This point is made later at 346a 1-3 where Plato uses δύναμιν. This short argument 
runs to 346e 2 and at 346d 5 he uses έργον.
■^In Book Two justice is placed in the class of pursuits that are good in themselves 
and for their consequences. I think Socrates would similarly place all knowledge.
See White pp. 48ff. on the question of benefits to the fully just man.
^%or a different view see Kerferd I, p. 22.
71 The first (argument against Thrasymachus), that no art seeks its own perfection qua 
art, seems entirely without relevance and I do not know what to make of it." Sparshott, 
p. 436
22At the time I wrote the following analyses I had not read Charles Young's excellent 
dissertation in which he documents the close connection between τέχνη and έπιστήμη 
in some Platonic arguments. Nor have I been able to include at this time any of his 
other valuable insights.
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It becomes clear later that a τέχνη in itself never seeks or provides for itself 
because it is complete and has no needs. A τέχνη, however, as possessed
’ V" ► - *«k. ·
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by any given craftsman is incomplete, so that a craftsman is always at work trying 
to gain more skill. At this point in the argument the claim is plausible, so 
Thrasymachus has no objection.
2ZfWhite, p. 49
25-
Cross and Woozley, pp. 51-55, discuss the,issue of Socrates' belief that 
virtue is knowledge in conjunction with the later discussion at 348c - 351c, 
where the implications of the craft argument arise again.
26 ■ ’ ·, : '
Plato is careful in the Republic to qualify his assertions by phrases such as,
"as much as a man can," phrases which are particularly prominent in his discussion 
of the philosophic ruler. I think it is clear from Plato's metaphysical position 
that no temporal ruler could in ordinary consciousness possess the full know­
ledge of anything. The return to the cave is the process of forgetting and the 
descent to imperfection. The philosophic ruler is the best human.that can 
arise but he or she is not perfect. ·
27519c 8- 520d 4 
2Q
Henderson not only criticizes this part of Socrates' argument ("The art of 
torture, for example, would surely fit Socrates' model," p. 226 f.), but also, 
pp. 224-227:? attempts quite persuasively to expose other defects in Socrates' 
analogy of the crafts, reaching conclusions very different from mine. I 
trust the arguments of this paper Show where and why I disagree with his analysis.
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Cross and Woozley, pp. 11-16, assert that Plato has shown an important 
difference between justice and the crafts in his argument with Polemarchus. Any 
skill has a capacity for opposites; it can be used well or ill. But the same 
cannot be true for justice, otherwise "The rogue and scoundrel will be as much 
a just man as is the honest dealer, the difference between them being that the 
former uses his justice for bad ends, the latter for good." p. 13 Plato is 
distinguishing "a man's capacities on the one hand and on the other hand his 
dispositions or character." p. 14 Plato is certainly aware of the difference 
noted, but his psychology regards both as forms of knowledge. Both fall under 
the most general concept, the good, as I argue shortly. In the notion of the crafts 
advanced here Plato holds that no craft can be abstracted legitimately from its 
end and treated as a value-free technique. See Cross and Woozley pp. 48-51 for 
additional comments about the craft argument.
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For a very different view see Sparshott, p. 436, where he distinguishes 
between service arts and exploitation arts. P.P. Nicholson seems to share my 
basic conviction. "Only when the idea of the Form of the Good is broached do 
we finally understand why Plato sees a necessary connection between arts and 
justice, via his conception of knowledge." p. 231
Cross and Woozley compare this argument to the argument with Polemarchus, 
pp. 53-55. For sharp disapproval of the argument see Sparshott pp. 443-445; 
Cross and Woozley pp. 51-55·
32Grube, p. 22, fn. 11 
33That health is a harmony is understood to parallel the example of tuning the 
lyre.
6S^The whole as the measure is used by Plato, for example, in discussion of the judge 
(409d 7-el) where virtue, a whole, will know itself and vice, whereas vice, a defect, 
will know neither itself nor virtue. More explicitly at 504c 1-3, "Nothing which is 
incomplete is a measure of anything,..." And at 486d 7 truth is akin to proper measure, 
έμμετρύα, not to lack of measure, άμετρύα,
^Because men are not perfect and there is the gap between knowing and acting, Socrates 
needs the more complex psychological analysis later in the Republic. Man not 
only possesses νους and έτηθυμία but also θυμός which can be habituated to beccxne an 
ally of νοϋς. Since a man cannot retain knowledge, which is a grasp of the completeness 
of Form, in a changing soul and body, he needs a psycholgocial support for his opinions, 
viz, θυμός. The craft argument is an idealized account. If craft knowledge has the 
characteristics Plato attributes to it, and if justice results from such a knowledge, 
then a man embodying this knowledge will never fail to be just. Such a view leaves out 
of account the question of whether knowledge as it exists in man can be overthrown by 
another characteristic in man, his passions. Because of the narrowness and abstractness 
of the argument no one is convinced. Men, as Thrasymachus, Glaucon, Adeimantus, and 
Socrates know them, appear to act differently, and Thrasymachus is rightly angered 
by Socrates’ unwillingness to take on the more complex issues.
53That 'getting more' is also irrelevant to a man as a whole requires the more detailed 
argument of the remainder of the Republic. The implication is that there must be a 
'balance' and 'tuning' in man as there is in bodily health and lyres. This extension 
Socrates makes as an addendum to the argument concerning strength at 352a 5-8. Later, 
as here, it is man's participation in knowing that allows him to measure his behavior.
54362a 4-7
